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Biases in inferences about representatives’ motives may
reinforce political acrimony
American politics is characterized by a high degree of partisan rancor, with seemingly little
common ground between Democrats and Republicans at the state or national level. But why is
compromise now so difficult to achieve? In new research which examines how people perceive
politicians’ motives, David Doherty finds that factors such whether or not they agree with a
representative’s position or their party affiliation can have a large influence. He writes that if
people’s perceptions lead them to conclude that politicians are acting in bad faith, despite them
agreeing on policy positions, then this will make political compromises even more difficult. 
The contemporary American political landscape is characterized by extreme levels of partisan acrimony. Some of
this is undoubtedly tied to sizable differences between the policy goals of Democrats and Republicans. However,
in new research I find evidence that an additional and perhaps more troubling psychological dynamic seems to
also be at work. People appear to not only dislike the substance of political opponents’ positions; they also infer
that these positions are being adopted for the “wrong reasons.” Similarly, not only do people tend to rate members
of the opposing party less favorably than co-partisans, they also see these out-partisans as driven by less savory
motives than co-partisans—even when they adopt an identical policy position. These inferences about politicians’
motives may foster a self-reinforcing dynamic where people are increasingly unwilling to compromise with those
“across the aisle” because they believe them to be acting in bad faith.
I fielded two experimental designs to explore these dynamics. In each experiment participants were presented
with a brief story about a representative who adopted a particular position on a policy (funding for either nuclear
power plants or farm subsidies). In each case, the representative’s position—whether he supported or opposed
the bill (and, thus, whether the respondent agreed or disagreed with his position)—was randomly assigned, as
was his party affiliation. After reading the story participants were asked to rate how important they thought each of
a series of 13 motives was in explaining the representative’s position on the bill.
The motive measures included:
five items that focused on the representative’s self-interested political motives: reelection goals, desire to
increase his political influence, special interest influence, pressure from leaders of his political party, and
desire to pander to voters;
four items designed to tap representation motives—the representative’s desire to serve the public: desire
to serve the people in his district, desire to serve the American public, desire to help people in need, and
desire to make good policy, and;
four items that capture judgments about the importance of policy motives associated with the
representative’s personal preferences: his own feelings about the bill, his personal values, his own policy
preferences, ideological reasons.
I combined the measures into three scales: one that measures how much the respondent believed the
representative’s position was driven by political self-interest, one that measures how much they attributed the
behavior to the representatives’ desire to serve the public, and one that measures the extent to which the
respondent saw the representative’s position as driven by his own policy preferences (Note: the findings I discuss
below were similar when individual items, rather than these summary measures, were used).
Figure 1 presents the average effects of the policy and party agreement experimental treatments across the two
studies. The policy agreement effect is the effect of presenting respondents with a representative who shares their
policy preferences, rather than one with whom they disagree (blue bars). The figure shows that people saw a
representative whose policy position they agreed with as only slightly less driven by political self-interest
compared to a representative with whom they disagreed. In fact, this effect fell short of conventional levels of
statistical significance in both studies. In contrast, people saw a representative whose position they agreed with as
significantly more driven by both a desire to serve the public (representation motives) and their own principled
policy preferences than a representative with whom they disagreed.
Figure 1 – Estimated Effects of Party and Policy Agreement on Motives Attributed to Representative
Note: 0 = Perceived motive of representative which respondents disagreed with (blue bars)
and from opposing party (orange bars)
The party agreement effects illustrated in Figure 1 are the effects of presenting partisan respondents with a
representative who shares their party affiliation, rather than a representative from the opposing party (orange
bars). The results are similar to those associated with policy agreement. Participants saw the position of a
representative from their preferred party to be substantially more motivated by principled policy preferences and a
desire to serve the public than a representative from the opposing party. The effect of partisan agreement on
inferences about the extent to which the representative was driven by political self-interest is somewhat larger
than the effect associated with policy agreement, but this effect only reached conventional levels of statistical
significance in one of the two experiments.
The findings regarding the effects of party agreement should be particularly troubling to those hoping for more
cordial relations between Democrats and Republicans. Recall that the party affiliation and substantive policy
position of the representative described in the experiment were each randomly assigned. Thus, the orange bars in
Figure 1 indicate that people see representatives from the opposing party as substantially less interested in
serving the public and less principled than representatives from their preferred party—even when they adopt
substantively identical policy positions.
I also explored whether people’s perceptions about a representative’s motives were associated with how they felt
about the representative in general. At the end of each experiment respondents were asked to rate the job
performance of the representative and how likely they would be to vote for the representative (each on a scale of
0-10). I averaged these two items into a single measure and estimated the relationship between each of the three
motive attribution measures and this summary rating of the representative.
Figure 2 reports the estimated change in the summary ratings associated with a moderate (two standard
deviation) increase in the importance people assigned to each of the motives as explanations for the
representative’s behavior. I benchmark these relationships to the direct effects of party and policy agreement on
these summary ratings.
Figure 2 – Relationships between Motive Attributions and Summary Evaluations of Representative
Two findings are particularly notable. First, there is a clear and sizable relationship between the importance that
people assign to the representation motives and policy motives measures, and their evaluation of the
representative. The magnitudes of these relationships are comparable to those associated with the policy and
party agreement treatments. Second, in spite of widespread complaints about politically motivated, excessively
self-interested politicians, respondents who saw a representative’s position-taking as particularly self-interested
did not evaluate them less favorably to any meaningful extent. This suggests that citizens may only be averse to
political self-interest insofar as they see it as a signal that politicians’ desire to serve the public and act in a
principled fashion are lacking.
It’s important to note that these experiments do not provide a way to determine whether people’s inference about
a representative’s motives affect how they evaluate that representative. They may, instead, reach a summary
judgment of the representative which affects their perceptions of the representative’s motives. However, in either
case, the dynamic is problematic. If inferences about a representative’s motives affect overall evaluations of that
representative, this would suggest that inferences that political opponents are driven by unsavory motives can
reinforce the growing political—and particularly partisan—antipathy found in the contemporary United States. If
people, instead, reach summary judgments of a representative and use these to make inferences about that
representative’s motives, these attributions may be used as a powerful means to justify their unfavorable
summary assessments (e.g., “Of course I don’t like Representative X, his actions are clearly unprincipled and
demonstrate a lack of desire to help the American people!”).
In summary, the findings from these experiments illustrate how inferences about motives may foster the seemingly
inexorable escalation of political conflict in the US. The findings presented in Figure 1 demonstrate that factors like
whether people personally agree with the position a representative adopts and whether they share the
representative’s party affiliation can affect their inferences about that representative’s motives. These motives
may foster, or serve as justification for, unfavorable summary evaluations of political opponents. Ultimately, if
people readily reach the conclusion that members of the opposing party are acting in bad faith—even when they
agree with their substantive policy position—it is perhaps little wonder that policy compromises have become
increasing difficult to reach.
This article is based on the paper ‘Perceived Motives in the Political Arena’ in American Politics Research.
Featured image credit: DonkeyHotey (Flickr, CC-BY-2.0)
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USApp– American Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1Eq0JQP
_________________________________
About the author
David Doherty – Loyola University Chicago
David Doherty is an assistant professor of political science at Loyola University Chicago. His
research addresses a variety of issues related to political attitudes and behavior.  
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 2014 LSE USAPP
